Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is...

O ceticismo é por vezes descartado como uma doutrina absurda e merecedora do seu lugar distante na antiguidade. Nada poderia ser menos correto. O ceticismo continua extremamente relevante para o pensamento filosófico e científico de hoje, servindo como um lembrete de que a sabedoria não é barata nem segura. Nesse texto, o meu objetivo principal é reproduzir o raciocínio das discussões clássicas sobre o ceticismo, mas de uma maneira coloquial e contemporânea. Após seguir as linhas de pensamento de Sexto Empírico, (...) René Descartes, e David Hume, eu vou extrair e identificar claramente as teses centrais que marcam as suas ideias. A minha intenção, porém, não é a de sugerir que as suas teses são auto-evidentes, ou incontestáveis, ou até hoje ainda incontestadas. Muito pelo contrário. A minha intenção é produzir um aperitivo ao debate e um convite a discussão. (shrink)

That the story of Cupid and Psyche in Apuleius' Metamorphoses is a version of a common world-wide folk-tale has long been recognized. Scholarly debate has concentrated on the conclusions to be drawn from this with regard to the significance of the story—mythological, religious, allegorical, and so on. With the additional information provided by Swahn's comprehensive monograph on the subject an attempt can now be made to study some of the aspects of literary technique involved in the adaptation of the folk-tale. (...) In what follows I have tried to avoid making any assumptions about a possible literary source of Apuleius' tale. I am concerned with the ways in which the literary version which we possess modifies the folk material, and not with the author of this modification. (shrink)

An alleged moral right to informational privacy assumes that we should have control over information about ourselves. What is the philosophical justification for this control? I think that one prevalent answer to this question—an answer that has to do with the justification of negative rights generally—will not do.

Mr Olding's recent attack on my exposition of the argument from design gives me an opportunity to defend the central theses of my original article. My article pointed out that there were arguments from design of two types—those which take as their premisses regularities of copresence and those which take as their premisses regularities of succession. I sought to defend an argument of the second type. One merit of such an argument is that there is no doubt about the truth (...) of its premisses. Almost all objects in the world behave in a highly regular way describable by scientific laws. Further, any scientific explanation of such a regularity must invoke some more general regularity. The most general regularities of all are, as such, scientifically inexplicable. The question arises whether there is a possible explanation of another kind which can be provided for them, and whether their occurrence gives any or much support to that explanation. I urged that we do explain some phenomena by explanation of an entirely different kind from the scientific. We explain states of affairs by the action of agents who bring them about intentionally of their own choice. Regularities of succession, as well as other phenomena may be explained in this way. Explanation of this kind I will term intentional explanation. Intentional explanation of some phenomenon E consists in adducing an agent A who brought E about of his own choice and a further end G which, he believed, would be forwarded by the production of E. (shrink)

In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams is rather severe on what he thinks of as an ethics of obligation. He has in mind by this Kant and W. D. Ross. For many, obligation seems the very core of ethics and the moral realm, and lives more generally are seen through the prism of this notion. This, according to Williams, flattens out our lives and moral experience and fails to take into account things which are obviously important to (...) our lives. Once we take these things into account, what do we do if they come into conflict with some of our moral obligations, as Williams, in his earlier writings on moral luck, thought to be the case. I want here to explore some of these ideas, in a way that I think harmonious with Williams's general bent though not one that I intend as in any way detailed exegesis of Williams's work. (shrink)

ACCORDING TO POPPER, SCIENTIFIC THEORIES ARE TO BE ACCEPTED IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE FALSIFIABLE AND IN SO FAR AS THEY HAVE BEEN CORROBORATED. THE CONCEPTS OF FALSIFIABILITY AND CORROBORATION ARE SUBMITTED TO DETAILED ANALYSIS. THE POINT OF ACCEPTING THEORIES, ACCORDING TO POPPER, IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH VERISIMILITUDE. HOWEVER THE BEST WE CAN DO IS TO OBTAIN THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMILITUDE. POPPER’S CRITERIA FOR ACCEPTING THEORIES WILL ONLY LEAD TO THEORIES OF HIGH PROBABLE VERISIMILITUDE ON NON-POPPERIAN (...) ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INDUCTION. (shrink)

_Purpose._ This article reveals the importance of the analysis of the theory of generations to identify the essential characteristics of the phenomenon of youth. _Theoretical basis_ of this study is socio-philosophical anthropology, i.e. philosophical anthropology using certain methods of sociological, socio-psychological and ethnological research, as well as philosophical comprehension of the application of these methods in special sciences. _Originality._ The authors rethought the theoretical and practical potential of generational theory through its reconceptualization based on philosophical anthropology, which created an opportunity (...) to shift research attention from the attempts to identify superhistorical characteristics of youth to the identification of the essential nature of specific historical and sociocultural features of young people as representatives of a particular culture. _Conclusions._ Defining the youth phenomenon requires accounting at least three constraints that on the one hand, play a role of warnings that deter from theoretical and practical errors in the study of the youth phenomenon, and on the other hand, guidelines for identifying real, specific characteristics of youth as a social phenomenon. Limitations of theoretical and practical analysis of young people are as follows: first, the need to consider demographic data not as final, but only as initial and preliminary, such that require further substantive socio-cultural analysis; second, the inadmissibility of ignoring the cultural diversity of the manifestations of the youth phenomenon, instead the need to identify the special characteristics of youth of different ethnic, religious and other groups; third, the need to take into account the specifics of self-identification of those who identify themselves as young people as a social group. (shrink)

This treatise on aesthetics criticizes various psychological theories of art, offers new theories and interpretations, and draws important inferences concerning ...

On what grounds will the rational man become a Christian? It is often assumed by many, especially non-Christians, that he will become a Christian if and only if he judges that the evidence available to him shows that it is more likely than not that the Christian theological system is true, that, in mathematical terms, on the evidence available to him, the probability of its truth is greater than half. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether or (...) not this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the rational man to adopt Christianity. (shrink)

IN THE COURSE OF "CONFIRMABILITY AND FACTUAL MEANINGFULNESS" ("ANALYSIS" VOL. 33) I ARGUED THAT THE CONFIRMATIONIST PRINCIPLE IS FALSE. THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE THAT A STATEMENT IS FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL IF AND ONLY IF IT IS AN OBSERVATION STATEMENT OR CONFIRMABLE BY OBSERVATION STATEMENTS. MY ARGUMENT CONSISTED IN PRODUCING EXAMPLES OF FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL STATEMENTS WHICH FAIL TO SATISFY THE PRINCIPLE. IN "CONFIRMABILITY AND MEANINGFULNESS" ("ANALYSIS" VOL. 34) R I SIKORA ARGUED THAT MY EXAMPLES DO NOT SUPPORT MY CONCLUSION. HERE I REPHRASE (...) THE EXAMPLES SO AS TO MEET SIKORA’S OBJECTIONS. THEY ARE EXAMPLES OF STATEMENTS WHICH ASSERT THE TRUTH OF STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE A CERTAIN FIXED PROBABILITY ON THE BEST EVIDENCE WHICH WILL EVER BE OBTAINED. (shrink)

HORIZONS ARE FRONTIERS BETWEEN THINGS OBSERVABLE AND THINGS UNOBSERVABLE. EVEN IS SUCH HORIZONS EXIST WE MAY LEARN ABOUT UNOBSERVABLE REGIONS OF THE UNIVERSE BY, (A) USING THE LAWS OF PHYSICS WHICH TELL US HOW A PRESENTLY OBSERVABLE GALAXY WILL EVOLVE WHEN NO LONGER OBSERVABLE OR, (B) USING THE COSMOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)